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Abstract 
Since Tversky’s (1977) seminal investigation, the triangle inequality, along with 
symmetry and minimality, have had a central role in investigations of the 
fundamental constraints on human similarity judgments. The meaning of 
minimality and symmetry in similarity judgments has been straightforward, but 
this is not the case for the triangle inequality. Expressed in terms of 
dissimilarities, and assuming a simple, linear function between dissimilarities 
and distances, the triangle inequality constraint implies that human behaviour 
should be consistent with Dissimilarity(A,B) + Dissimilarity(B,C) ≥ 
Dissimilarity(A,C), where A, B, and C are any three stimuli. We show how we can 
translate this constraint into one for similarities, using Shepard’s (1987) 
generalization law, and so derive the multiplicative triangle inequality for 
similarities,    (   )     (   )     (   ) where      (   )   . Can 
humans violate the multiplicative triangle inequality? An empirical 
demonstration shows that they can.  
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1. Introduction  
Tversky’s (1977) famous work is widely interpreted as showing that similarity 
judgments are not consistent with the metric axioms, thus casting a critical eye on the 
widespread approach to representation and similarity based on psychological spaces 
(for earlier examination see Attneave, 1950, Rosch, 1975). Specifically, all distances 
must obey the metric axioms:  
 Minimality: Distance(A,A) = 0 
Symmetry: Distance(A,B) = Distance(B,A) 
Triangle Inequality: Distance(A,B) + Distance(B,C)  ≥ Distance(A,C) 
If we employ distances in psychological spaces to model similarities, should it not be the 
case that similarities need be consistent with the metric axioms? Then, the common 
interpretation of Tversky’s work is that models of similarity based on distances cannot 
be adequate.  
 This interpretation is correct for symmetry and minimality (that the similarity 
between an item and itself should be maximal and that similarities should be 
symmetric). However, in fact, Tversky (1977) provided only a much weaker argument 
regarding the triangle inequality and similarities. He discussed the triangle inequality in 
relation to a famous example, based on William James. Tversky noted (p.329) “the 
perceived distance of Jamaica to Russia exceeds the perceived distance of Jamaica to 
Cuba, plus that of Cuba to Russia – contrary to the triangle inequality.” If we equate 
distances with (some simple function of) dissimilarities, the triangle inequality 
constraint for these countries can be written as 
             (              )
              (            )              (           ) 
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Jamaica and Russia are highly dissimilar to each other, while Jamaica and Cuba 
have a very low dissimilarity (because of geographical location) and likewise for Cuba 
and Russia (because of political affiliation), so violating the triangle inequality – for 
dissimilarities. In both the original paper and a subsequent one (Tversky & Gati, 1982) 
Tversky is extremely careful to limit the scope of this conclusion. For example, he said  
(Tversky, 1977, p.329)  “…the triangle inequality implies that if a is quite similar to b, 
and b is quite similar to c, then a and c cannot be very dissimilar from each other. Thus, 
it sets a lower limit to the similarity between a and c in terms of the similarities between 
a and b and between b and c.” But, this expression is not a quantitative constraint.  
 Thus, despite the fact that Tversky’s work was nearly 40 years ago, there is 
currently no precise notion of how the triangle inequality translates into a constraint for 
similarities, as opposed to dissimilarities. Resolving this problem is important both for 
studies into the foundations of human similarity judgments and, more practically, since 
the majority of psychological research has focused on similarity, not dissimilarity (e.g., 
Medin et al., 1990; Minda & Smith, 2001; Nosofsky, 1984; Pothos, 2005).  
 Why is it not possible to just assume a violation of triangle inequalities and re-
express it in terms of similarities? One might be inclined to write a triangle inequality 
with similarities as  
          (   )            (   )            (   ) 
However, such an expression is valid only if we set                          , which 
is problematic. Dissimilarities are straightforwardly equated with distances, which have 
to be positive. But, similarities are also typically considered positive: our intuition of 
psychological similarity is that of a positive quantity and, operationally, similarity is 
always measured with positive scales. We can imagine other, ‘convenient’ functions 
linking similarity and dissimilarity, but, in the absence of psychological theory, such 
functions are arbitrary. There is also the complication that in certain cases the two 
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measures may not have a simple inverse relation (Medin, Goldstone & Gentner, 1990), 
but this possibility is beyond this study. 
The most widely adopted function linking distances and similarities is Shepard’s 
(1987) law of generalization, according to which                      . Shepard’s law 
is still very much at the heart of influential cognitive theories, such as Nosofsky’s (1984) 
Generalized Context Model or the Minda-Smith version of prototype theory (Minda & 
Smith, 2001). Shepard’s law assumes that similarity is a ratio scale between 0, 1. While 
this seems like a strong assumption (e.g., Tversky & Gati, 1982, focused on ordinal 
relations), note that most empirical similarity measures are based on Likert scales. 
When using a Likert scale, a common (if not sometimes tacit) assumption is that such 
scales are linear and so correspond to interval, possibly ratio, scales. For example, naïve 
observers are able to make fine discriminations of similarity. Moreover, accepting that 
there are pairs of stimuli that have zero psychological similarity indicates a ratio scale 
for psychological similarity. It is possible to question this assumption of linearity, which 
would undermine the present discussion. However, the present authors are not aware 
of any evidence against linearity and hypothetical arguments to the contrary appear 
contrived.  
We can use Shepard’s (1987) law to derive a constraint for similarities, from the 
triangle inequality:  
        (   )          (   )          (   )  
          (   )    (        (  )         (   ))  
          (   )             (  )            (   ) 
which gives:   
   (   )     (   )     (   ) 
 We call this latter inequality the multiplicative triangle inequality (MTI) and it 
indicates that, if we consider the similarity of two stimuli (A,C) to a third one (B), then 
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the product of the similarities to the third one provides a lower bound for the similarity 
of the two initial stimuli. For example, for three objects, table, chair and bed, the lower 
bound for the similarity between a table and a chair is the product of the similarities 
between table and bed and chair and bed. As far as we know, the MTI is a unique 
proposal for how human similarity judgments are constrained, it is the most 
straightforward way to derive a constraint on similarities from the triangle inequality, 
and it has not been empirically investigated before (we further justify this last comment 
shortly below) 
Note, the literature has also considered similarity functions using a Gaussian, 
rather than exponential form. However, according to Nosofsky (1992), the Gaussian 
similarity function applies with “protracted identification training involving asymptotic 
performance with highly confusable stimuli” (p.29). With a Gaussian similarity function, 
we have: 
           (   )
 
   (        (  )         (   ))
 
  
          (   )
 
           (  )
 
          (   )
 
           (  )         (   ) 
which gives: 
   (   )     (   )     (   )    
where      . Thus, with a Gaussian similarity function, we do not reproduce the 
MTI, but a weaker form, since stimuli which violate the exponential MTI may be 
consistent with its Gaussian form. In this work, we employ distinguishable stimuli, 
which are presented only once, and for which only one response is made. Thus, the 
(limited) literature only allows to motivate the exponential form of the MTI and we will 
only consider this henceforth.  
 The MTI clearly has a distinct form compared to the triangle inequality. Note, 
that a violation of the MTI implies a violation the triangle inequality and vice versa. This 
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is easily seen by noting that if         (  )          (  )          (  ) (a 
violation of the triangle inequality) then           (  )         (  )            (  ) 
   (  )     (  )     (  ) (a violation of the MTI). Is there empirical evidence that 
the MTI is violated and is it established how violations of the MTI can arise from 
similarity models? We suggest that the answer is no for both questions. First, Tversky’s 
(1977) anecdotal example for how dissimilarities violate the triangle inequality perhaps 
suggests that the MTI would be violated as well. However, this is not a direct empirical 
demonstration and in fact we are not aware of empirical reports focusing on violations 
of the MTI (that is, violations of the triangle inequality, as translated for similarities; cf. 
Tversky & Gati, 1982). There are some reports in the literature which may look like 
relevant evidence, but this is not the case. For example, Voorspoels et al. (2011), as part 
of a similarity study, reported on violations of the triangle inequality. But, they derived a 
similarity matrix based on feature vectors and it is possible that the situation regarding 
the triangle inequality/ MTI would be different with direct similarity ratings. Also, the 
highest rate of triangle inequality violations was 0.13%, which indicates, if anything, no 
violations.  
 Second, regarding theoretical accounts,  there have been several influential 
similarity proposals, notably from Krumhansl (1978) and Ashby and Perrin (1988), 
which all purport to cover Tversky’s (1977) key findings, including violations of the 
triangle inequality. So, exactly how theoretically pertinent is it to still research the 
triangle inequality (or the MTI)? Is it not the case that, across a research tradition 
spanning several decades, we now have several satisfactory similarity theories?  
Both Krumhansl’s (1978) and Ashby and Perrin’s (1988) theories, for all their 
significant overall contributions to our understanding of similarity, actually provide a 
poor account of violations of the triangle inequality. Krumhansl’s (1978) explanation for 
the triangle inequality is based on the idea that similarity judgments emphasize 
dimensions and features that objects have in common. As a result, stimuli which are far 
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apart in an overall psychological space may be close to each other in a low 
dimensionality subspace, corresponding to the common dimensions between the 
stimuli. For example, Russia and Cuba are similar in the subspace of Communism, which 
corresponds to their common dimension. Krumhansl (1978, p.12) notes “Subspaces 
defined by obvious stimulus dimensions would seem to be likelier projections than 
subspaces not corresponding to such dimensions” and goes on to observe that such a 
scheme may be able to account for similarity relations inconsistent with the triangle 
inequality. But, why should similarity be assessed in a subspace for the triangle 
inequality comparisons and not in other cases? Krumhansl’s model does not provide any 
guidance as to when similarity should be assessed in subspaces or the way to determine 
the relevant subspaces.  
Regarding Ashby and Perrin (1988), they showed how one can manipulate the 
perceptual effects distributions, so that two stimuli can be both dissimilar to each other 
and both similar to a third stimulus, hence violating the triangle inequality. Such a 
situation can be mapped to Tversky’s (1977) Russia-Cuba-Jamaica example. However, 
this argument assumes (see their Figure 4, p.133) asymmetric and inequivalent 
perceptual effects distributions for the three stimuli. This is an unlikely assumption in 
the case of, for example, comparisons between Russia, Cuba, and Jamaica. Why would 
the distributions for such countries have a different shape?  
Note, finally, that Nosofsky’s (1984) influential Generalized Context Model can 
produce violations of the triangle inequality, through manipulations of its attentional 
parameters. But, without an independent way to predict the setting of the attentional 
weights, this is a post hoc explanation. An analogous argument applies to Tversky’s 
(1977) own contrast model, which relies on parameter setting to accommodate 
violations of the metric axioms (though note again that, regarding the triangle inequality 
on similarities, no direct demonstration or model fit was offered by Tversky, 1977). 
There other less well-known accounts, that are potentially relevant. For example, Jaekel 
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et al.’s (2008) proposal of similarity metrics, based on a Hilbert space (a kind of vector 
space) and Shepard’s (1987) generalization law, can produce violations of the triangle 
inequality, though the concurrent coverage of violations of symmetry and minimality is 
unclear (all the other similarity accounts considered here aim for a comprehensive 
coverage of Tversky’s, 1977, key results). Overall, it is a misleading impression that 
violations of the triangle inequality can be straightforwardly explained by dominant 
similarity approaches, which makes it unlikely that they can produce violations of the 
MTI in a satisfactory way too.  
Recently, we proposed a similarity model based on the mathematics of quantum 
theory (QT), specifically so as to account for Tversky’s (1977) key findings as naturally 
as possibly (Pothos et al., 2013). In fact, this similarity approach can naturally cover 
putative violations of the MTI (and the triangle inequality, if one considers 
dissimilarities). That this is the case can be explained fairly directly, without detailed 
modelling. We note that this does not preclude that other similarity approaches may be 
extended to cover putative violations of the MTI in a natural way, though, the 
corresponding detailed argument is beyond this paper.  
QT provides rules for assigning probabilities to events, from quantum 
mechanics, without the physics. Some researchers have been pursuing QT cognitive 
models, especially for behaviors at odds with the more established classical probability 
theory (Aerts & Aerts, 1995; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2011; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013; 
Haven & Khrennikov, 2013). Regarding similarity, in the QT model, representations are 
subspaces in a multidimensional vector space. A subspace can have a higher or lower 
dimensionality, depending on the extent of knowledge we have for the corresponding 
stimulus or concept. The mental state is modeled by a state vector,   〉. Each subspace is 
associated with a projection operator, which computes the overlap between a vector 
(e.g., the mental state vector) and a subspace. Following from Tversky’s (1977) triangle 
inequality example, if the projection operator for Russia is        , then the overlap 
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between the Russia subspace and the mental state is the vector           〉, whose 
length squared,            〉 
  is the probability that the mental state is about Russia. 
Similarity is defined as           (              )                      〉 
 . 
Regarding the MTI, we have    (   )     (   )     (   )           〉 
  
         〉 
           〉 
 . But, e.g. with one dimensional subspaces (and 
appropriate state vectors, cf. Pothos et al., 2013), this implies            
     
       , where the angles are between the corresponding rays, as indicated. It is clearly 
possible to violate the MTI with the QT similarity model, e.g., with     
 
 
     and 
    
 
 
, which gives       .  
The more important point is that a prediction of MTI violation for Tversky’s 
(1977) triangle inequality example emerges from the QT similarity model, in the sense 
that it follows from the corresponding representations and no further assumptions are 
needed. The representation in Figure 1 was put together on the basis of three, intuitive/ 
reasonable assumptions: the property of Communism should be as unrelated as possible 
to the property of being in the Caribbean; Russia should have as much overlap as 
possible with the Communism property and as little as possible with the in the 
Caribbean one and vice versa for Jamaica; Cuba should have overlap with both the 
Communism and the in the Caribbean properties. These assumptions are indeed the 
ones Tversky (1977) made in arguing for violations of the triangle inequality. Note, this 
is toy representation, since no psychologically plausible representation would involve 
simple rays. Nevertheless it is useful for illustration. Given Figure 1, a violation of the 
MTI is readily predicted, since                                          , which 
implies             
        
        (  )     (  )     (  ). violating the 
MTI (Pothos et al., 2013).  
Our argument that violations of the MTI are natural in the QT model has been 
that, given the Figure 1 (reasonable) representation, then a violation of the MTI just 
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follows. However, it needs be pointed out that perhaps, ideally, empirical similarity data 
would be used to derive a representation (along the lines of that in Figure 1). and then 
examine directly (without further fits) whether the MTI is violated or not. 
Unfortunately, the QT similarity program is not at this point yet. The problem is that we 
do not know how to determine the optimal dimensionality for the subspace 
corresponding to each concept (in the above example they are all rays); this is an 
important objective for future work. 
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Figure 1. A plausible toy representation for Russian, Cuba, Jamaica, relative to the 
properties of Communism and in the Caribbean. Given this representation, a violation of 
the MTI from the QT similarity model readily emerges.  
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Overall, Tversky’s (1977) Jamaica, Cuba, Russia example makes it fairly plausible 
that violations of the MTI will be observed in similarity judgments. However, it is 
impossible to establish this without detailed measurements. If similarity judgments are 
mostly consistent with the MTI, then this would make suspect the QT similarity 
approach and force us to rethink the motivation for the model. To anticipate our results, 
this is not the case.   
2. Participants, materials, and methods  
We tested 431 experimentally naïve participants, recruited through CrowdFlower, for a 
small payment ($1; due to a computer error, the payment was not administered 
correctly and we could only manually pay participants who got in touch with us. The 
payment error manifested itself after the experimental tasks). The sample size was a 
priori set to 400 participants, but the recruitment process (automated through 
CrowdFlower) overshot. Participants were randomly divided between two conditions, 
which employed different stimuli.  
 We constructed two lists of stimulus triplets, one consisting of 19 country 
triplets and another consisting of 21 general stimulus triplets (Appendix 1). The triplets 
were constructed so that two pairs of stimuli were expected to lead to a high similarity 
while the third pair would have low similarity, e.g., for countries, Mexico, USA, Canada 
and for general stimuli Razor, Knife, Fork, but no piloting was carried out, since we were 
not intending detailed modelling. Participants were randomly assigned either to the 
countries or the general stimuli.  
 To assess putative MTI violations for each triplet, we required three similarity 
ratings, so that for the countries stimuli there were overall 57 similarity ratings and for 
the general stimuli 63; in both cases, participants performed the ratings in a random 
order. Each trial involved showing the two stimuli concurrently on a screen, with the 
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prompt to rate their similarity on a 1-9 scale. The stimuli remained on the screen until a 
response was provided. 
 
3. Results  
For each participant we computed the variance of all their similarity judgments and 
removed participants with either very high (e.g., participants using only 1 or 9) or very 
low (participants not using the full scale) variances. Cutoffs for high, low variance were 
10, 0.7 respectively. This procedure retained 191 out of 212 participants for the 
countries stimuli, and 197 out of 219 for the general stimuli. Similarity ratings for the 
remaining participants were then converted via a linear rescaling to a 0 to 1 scale, since, 
recall, similarities in the MTI were derived using Shepard’s (1987) generalization law 
and so bounded by 0,1. 
There are two subtle issues which affect the analysis of results. First, a violation 
of the MTI occurs when    (   )     (   )     (   ). Recall, the empirical 
procedure involved triplets of items, A, B, C, for which we collected empirical data for all 
pairwise similarities. For each triplet, we could identify the lowest similarity and so seek 
putative MTI violations. However, this procedure is inappropriate and would simply 
increase Type I errors, since for each triplet the stimuli A, B, C were specifically selected 
so that one similarity would be low and the other two similarities higher. So, we tested 
for violations of the MTI just in terms of which pairwise similarity was expected to be 
lower than the other two (note, the relationships between the A, B, C stimuli are 
obvious; see Appendix 1). Second, the MTI as a constraint on similarity judgments 
makes most sense when a consistent/ fixed order is employed throughout all relevant 
pairwise comparisons and this is the approach we adopted (with future work we will 
explore the implications from possible violations of symmetry).  
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We first considered the reliability of the data, using a measure of MTI violation 
(since the MTI states that    (   )     (   )     (   ) we computed    (   )  
   (   )     (   ), which will be negative if the MTI is violated). This reliability 
analysis indicates whether participants consistently produce a greater level of violations 
of the MTI for some triplets of stimuli than for others. For the countries and general 
stimuli Cronbach’s alpha was .70 (N=191) and .84 (N=197), respectively. The materials, 
therefore, differed in the degree to which they consistently showed possible violations 
of the MTI (see also Figure 2).  
The null hypothesis is that the MTI is a psychological constraint, so that 
similarity judgments will always be consistent with the MTI, excluding the possibility of 
random variation in ratings. Thus, for each triplet, there is a possibility that a violation 
of the MTI will be observed by chance. To compute this chance probability, we 
considered all possible combinations of 1-9 similarity ratings, for each triplet (converted 
to a 0,1 scale), and counted the percentage of triplets in which an MTI violation was 
observed: this was 25%. This is a conservative estimate of random error, since, given a 
null hypothesis that similarity judgments are always consistent with the MTI, we still 
assume a rate of by chance MTI violation for any triplet of ¼. Note also that in 
considering a triplet,    (   )    (   )    (   ), the three similarities are not 
completely independent. However, when considering correlations between triplet 
similarities, the random error rate is reduced. We can see this by noting that the MTI is 
not violated when the three similarities are equal or when    (   ) is equal to one of 
the other two similarities. Instead, MTI violations occur when there is a mismatch 
between the similarities, with    (   ) small but the other two large. Thus, if anything, 
the effect of taking into account correlations would be to make it easier to reject the null 
hypothesis. 
 We conducted an item-based analysis, testing that the proportion of MTI 
violations for a given triplet was higher than the 25% error rate expected by chance 
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(participants were treated as a random effect). Note, there are no expectations as to 
whether the MTI is consistently violated in a set of items. Instead, the null hypothesis is 
that the MTI is a psychological constraint and rejecting the null hypothesis involves 
existence proof that there are some items for which the MTI is violated. The MTI 
violation count for each triplet was based on when    (   )     (   )     (   )  
 , where A,C was the pair of stimuli assumed a priori to be most similar. Using a 
dependent variable based on binary counts (for each triplet, for each participant, 
checking whether the MTI was violated or not) is justified because the distribution of 
   (   )     (   )     (   ) values was not normal (this is because when it is in 
principle possible to violate the MTI; most violations are observed for small positive 
values of this quantity).  
 
A 
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B 
  
Figure 2. Diagrams (A: countries stimuli; B general stimuli) indicating the distribution of 
violations of the MTI, across participant responses. Each data point means that the 
corresponding combination of Sim(A,B), Sim(B,C), Sim(A,C), for which an MTI violation 
occurs, was observed at least twice (we suppressed points indicating a single violation, 
to unclutter the diagrams). Larger circles and color from blue to red both indicate 
greater frequencies. 
 
Using chi-squared tests with alpha set at .05, we observed 4/19 significant 
violations for the countries and 10/21 for the general stimuli (highest p-value amongst 
the significant violations .035, see Appendix 1). The significance level for rejecting the 
null hypothesis for each triplet was set to .05, so by chance we still expect 1/20 MTI 
violations for each stimulus category. The proportion 1/20 was significantly different 
from 4/19 (p=.013), and even more so from 10/21 (p<.0005; in both cases using 
Fisher’s Exact Probability Test on one degree of freedom).  
One possible issue with the analysis above is that some ratings of the similarity 
between stimuli make an MTI violation impossible. For example, if a participant rates 
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the similarity between A and B as 1 out of 9, this implies    (   )   , and a violation 
of the MTI is now impossible whatever the other two similarities. To investigate this we 
reanalyzed the data, ignoring, for a given triplet of stimuli, responses of 1 for the A,B or 
B,C similarities (which would lead to a converted similarity of 0, making an MTI 
violation impossible). This approach changes the frequency of observed MTI violations, 
reduces the sample size for each triplet of  stimuli (because of the eliminated responses; 
the range of responses for each triplet is now 64-179), and increases the expected rate 
of obtaining MTI violations by chance from 25% to 33%, for a given triplet. For the 
general stimuli, the rate of violations (14/21) was still significantly higher than the 
chance 1/20 rate (p<.0005) but for the countries stimuli (3/19) it was now not 
significantly different from the chance rate ( p=.067). This gives us confidence that an 
overall conclusion of MTI violations, in some cases, is independent of the precise way we 
analyze the data. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Tversky’s (1977) seminal influence was that he started a research programme into the 
algebraic foundations of similarity judgments and, indeed, most major subsequent 
similarity proposals are often tested against his key empirical conclusions regarding 
violations of the metric axioms. However, we showed that implications for similarity 
from the triangle inequality have not been worked out and require a commitment to a 
function linking distance and similarity. Another seminal influence in psychology, 
Shepard’s (1987) generalization law, was used for this purpose. We thus derived the 
MTI and, in one experiment, provided an existence proof that the MTI is sometimes 
violated in similarity judgments. Note, our results offer no guidance as to what might be 
the proportion of MTI violations, if one were to select a triplet of items randomly, that is, 
we currently cannot provide guidance into the manipulations which may make 
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violations of the MTI more or less likely (contrast with e.g. Aguilar and Medin, 1999, in 
relation to symmetry)  All the stimuli were selected with an expectation that violations 
of the MTI may be ‘likely’ and so, if one were to cast a critical eye on our results, one 
could say that the evidence for the preponderance of MTI violations in human similarity 
judgments is not strong. However, as Tversky (1977) intended in his original discussion, 
our results do provide clear existence proof that the MTI can be violated sometimes.  
 A researcher insisting on conceptualizing similarity as a function of distance may 
explore alternative functions linking similarity and distance, such as a Gaussian 
function. However, violations of the exponential MTI version, for stimuli as the ones 
employed in this study will still need to be explained or, alternatively, a Gaussian 
similarity function will need to be motivated more strongly for all kinds of stimuli. This 
latter possibility is inconsistent with the available evidence (Nosofsky, 1992), though 
note the issue of exponential vs. Gaussian similarity functions has not attracted much 
attention recently (indeed some researchers use a free parameter corresponding to the 
exact form of the similarity function). An alternative approach might be to adopt 
Nosofsky’s (1984, 1992) formalization, which offers parametric flexibility to 
accommodate both MTI violations and violations of the other metric axioms (such as 
symmetry, using a directionality parameter). While there is no doubt that his theory is 
one of the most influential categorization theories, it is arguable as to whether similarity 
researchers will be satisfied with this approach, unless parametric changes can be 
motivated independently; currently this is not possible.  
Our motivation for pursuing this research was exactly because of its potential to 
provide results which are particularly easy to accommodate within the QT similarity 
model (Pothos et al., 2013). We interpret violations of the MTI inequality as additional 
support for the QT similarity model, while of course acknowledging that this is a vast 
research topic that cannot be settled by any single study. In brief, the psychological 
explanation for how violations of the MTI arise from the QT similarity model relates 
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generally to the contextual way in which probabilities are assessed in QT. Different 
regions of psychological space imply different properties or contexts for assessing 
similarity. For example, regarding the Figure 1 representation, the Communism region 
is the part of psychological space where countries consistent with this property cluster. 
So, two countries which are close to each other in the Communism region of 
psychological space can be said to be similar to each because they are both consistent 
with the property of Communism, and analogously with the property in the Caribbean 
etc. Regarding the problem at hand, because of the geometry of how such different 
regions are arranged, one can easily construct patterns that violate the MTI inequality. It 
is exactly this contextuality that is characteristic of the QT similarity model (and QT 
models in general) that provides a natural interpretation of this and related similarity 
findings (such as the diagnosticity effect, which Tversky, 1977, also reported). Note, as 
the number of possible stimuli increases, it is likely that a pattern of similarity relations 
of a certain complexity will constraint the minimum dimensionality of the 
corresponding QT space; this is an interesting topic for future work.  
 In closing, understanding the formal properties of similarity judgments is a key 
objective not only in cognitive science (since similarity is often the building block of 
cognitive models; Goldstone & Son, 2005; Pothos, 2005; Sloman & Rips, 1998; see also 
Gärdenfors, 2000), but beyond too. For example, in information retrieval, most models 
are based on vector spaces (e.g., Salton et al., 1975), and the corresponding ranking 
algorithms are either obviously consistent with the metric axioms or a detailed 
assessment is not made (e.g., Manning et al., 2009; Robertson & Spärck Jones, 1976). 
Similar considerations apply to e.g. latent semantic analysis (e.g., Dumais, 2004). In 
presenting these results, we hope to provide an important technical modification in our 
understanding of violations of the triangle inequality and, in addition, a further source of 
evidence concerning the QT similarity model.  
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Appendix 1. The materials used in the two conditions of the experiment. After each 
triplet, we show the number of participants violating the MTI (in the countries case 191 
participants overall and in the general stimuli case 197 participants).  We also give the p 
value computed from a   test on one degree of freedom, assuming a chance violation 
rate per participant of 25%. 
 
Country triplets:  
Country A Country B Country C 
% of Ps violating MTI p Value (one-
tailed) 
Mexico USA Canada 39.3 <.001 
Jamaica Cuba Russia 41.4 <.001 
India Pakistan Iran 49.7 <.001 
Albania Greece Italy 28.3 .29 
The 
Netherlands 
Germany Poland 
22.5 - 
Norway Latvia Slovenia 12.6 - 
Portugal Brazil Uruguay 27.2 .48 
Australia UK Zimbabwe 7.9 - 
Spain France Switzerland 27.2 .48 
North Korea China Japan 32.5 .017 
Saudi Arabia Nigeria Ghana 20.4 - 
Turkey Cyprus Malta 24.1 - 
Luxemburg 
Cayman 
Islands 
Dominican 
Republic 
15.7 - 
Malaysia Singapore Gibraltar 16.8 - 
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Austria Hungary Romania 17.3 - 
Ireland Madagascar Mozambique 16.8 - 
Nepal Mongolia Greenland 10.5 - 
Dubai Panama Colombia 16.2 - 
Croatia Serbia Bulgaria 13.6 - 
 
Triplets of general stimuli:  
Item A Item B Item C % of Ps violating MTI p Value (one-tailed) 
Butcher               Surgeon GP 31.5 .035 
Razor              Knife     Fork   59.4 <.001 
Cheetah             Bullet  Dart    24.9 - 
Skyscraper         Giraffe    Zebra 44.2 <.001 
Fossil                 Skeleton    Muscle 48.7 <.001 
Sheet              Plain     Mountain    18.8 - 
Fox                  Lawyer    Teacher 17.8 - 
Snail                       Tortoise Hamster 16.8 - 
Mouse           Cockroach  Locust    19.8 - 
Feather              Fur   Bear 54.3 <.001 
Oven Tropics   Ocean 46.2 <.001 
Pig  Dirt Stain   33.5 .006 
Porcupine  Cactus Palm-Tree 45.7 <.001 
Book  Magazine TV-show 17.8 - 
Ice  Alaska  Hawaii   46.7 <.001 
Mule  Negotiator Counsellor 7.6 - 
Butterfly  Blue-Bird  Crow   24.9 - 
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Ant  
Poppy-
seed 
Mustard 
21.3 - 
Doughnut  
Wedding-
ring   
Necklace 
32.5 .015 
Skunk  Pig-sty Chicken-shed 28.9 .21 
Zebra  Wasp Fly 13.7 - 
 
 
